NA by Burnham, F.H.
A METHOD FOR COMPARING SURFACE TO AIR
GiiiDED MISSILE SYSTEMS FOR THE DEFEnI
OF NAVAL SURFACE UNiTS
F, !i BURNHAM
W: -\* .-'(-]^^^i^^Xvv:cr/vVr:'
'At-v
PIP*
^^S Naval Postgraduate
ScH
Monterey,
CaUfonda




Artisan Gold Lettering & Smith Bindery
593 - 15th Street Oakland. Calif. SLencourt 1-9827
DIRECTIONS FOR BINDING
BIND IN
(CIRCLE ONE)
BUCKRAM
COLOR NO._
?>85A
FABRIKOID
COLOR
LEATHER
COLOR
OTHER INSTRUCTIONS
Letter in gold.
Letter on the fror
A l^THOD FOR CC
GUIDED laSSILE
OF NAVAL
F.H.
LEHERING Ol^rffACK
TO BE EXACTLY AS
PRINTED HERE.
BURMHAM
1954
Thesis
B884
t cover:
ITARING SURFACE TO AIR
SYSTE!vS FOR THE DEFENSE
SURFACE UNITS
BURNHAM
EMS
UNITS

A METHOD FOR COMPARING
SURFACE TO AIR GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEMS
FOR THE DEFENSE OF NAVAL SURFACE UNITS
by
F. H. BURNHAM
//
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
United States Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
19 5 4

V V
Library
"V. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Califomid
This work is accepted as fulfilling
the thesis requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
from the
United States Naval Postgraduate School

PREFACE
This paper considers certain problems which will arise in connect-
ion with the employment of surface launched guided missiles for anti-air-
craft defense of naval surface units. It is stated here, once for all, that
for the sake of brevity, such expressions as "guided missile team" and
"guided missile system", are always used with the nneaning: surface
launched guided missiles for anti-aircraft defense of naval surface units.
The great progress made in the development of guided missiles in
the past decade makes it appear highly probable that there will be avail-
able, in the near future, many guided missile systems suitable for install-
ation on various kinds of ships. From a search of the available literature,
it appears that there has been no extensive study made of how ships with
such installations can be assigned nnost effectively to the defense of naval
surface groups (convoys, task forces, independents) requiring such protect-
ion. Accordingly, this paper sets forth the idea that there nnay well be a
number of different kinds of ship teams for providing this type of protection.
The concept of a team is that of one or more ships, possessing capabilities
for launching and/o]jr guidance and possibly performing some part of the
target detection function. Each type of team would be based upon a parti-
cular guided missile system.
The team concept is itself not essentially new, but has suggested
itself in other cases where the weapon system has had a specific rather
than a multi-purpose role, (e.g. hunter-killer teams, ASW teams, night
fighter and night attack teanns).
ii

With the guided missile team concept, it becomes necessary to
determine the criteria on the basis of which such teams should be
assigned to various surface groups requiring this kind of protection.
It is with the determination of these criteria that this paper is primarily
concerned.
In determining such criteria, it is essential that certain striking
contrasts between guided nriissile defense and conventional anti-aircraft
defense of naval surface units be recognized, namely:
(1) The cost of guided missiles as compared to the cbat of
conventional anti-aircraft weapons.
(2) The relatively limited numbers of guided missiles which can
be carried by a team as compared to the essentially unlimited
numbers of expandable rounds of conventional anti-aircraft
ordnance which can be carried by a group of ships. This
aspect of the problem is similar to that of submarines in the
use of their torpedoes.
This study, undertaken at the United States Naval Postgraduate
School during the latter half of academic year 1954, attempts to provide
a quantitative analysis of the defensive potential of several guided missile
teams. Particular emphasis has been placed upon the problem of
selecting an optimal team for the anti-aircraft defense of naval surface
units operating without the benefit of air support, since the writer
believes that guided missiles for anti-aircraft defense will make their
greatest single contribution under such circumstances.
The writer is indebted to Dr. T. E. Oberbeck and Dr. C. C.
Torrance of the United States Postgraduate School Staff. Their suggest-
ions and help in the preparation of this paper are sincerely appreciated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. Summary
This study examines the problem of selecting an optimal guided
missile team for the defense of a naval surface unit against aircraft
attack when several teams are available and the characteristics of each
team are known.
A measure of effectiveness, for making quantitative coniparisons
of such t«ams, is defined and its application is demonstrated for two
conditions under which these teams nnay be expected to operate. These
operating conditions are defined as follows:
Operating condition one : An upper limit of the expected dan\age
per attack to the protected unit is specified.
Operating condition two ; No upper limit of the expected damage
is specified, but it is desirable that the ratio of enemy loss to
our loss be a maxinnum.
Methods are formulated for calculating the values of the parameters
appearing in the measure.
For the sake of concreteness, the measure of effectiveness is applied
to make a comparison of three hypothetical teams which could be used for
the defense of a convoy.
Although this measure was defined without consideration of contri-
butions to the defensive effort by friendly air-craft and anti-aircraft guns,
it can be applied with minor modifications to cases where these weapons
are an integral part of the defense.

Z, The situation
The problem of assigning the optimal guided missile teann to the
defense of a naval surface unit is predicated upon the following assumed
situation:
A Fleet or Force Commander must provide anti-aircraft protect-
ion for a group of surface vessels which are expected to experience
attacks by enemy aircraft during a voyage. The assignment of aircraft
carriers for this purpose is not feasible. The Connmander has at his
disposal several guided missile teams which have the capability of
defending against aircraft attack. The characteristics of each of the
available teams are known. The team which the Commander assigns
must operate under one of two conditions, namely:
(a) Because of the military situation, the expected damage to
the defended unit per attack must not exceed a certain value.
(b) The expected damage to the defended unit per attack is not
limited, but it is desired that the ratio of enemy losses to our
losses be a maximum.
3. The approach to the problem
The problem is approached by defining a measure of effectiveness
for making quantitative comparisons of the teams available for assign-
ment. An attempt has been made to include in the measure only those
parameters which are essential to a satisfactory comparison. Techniques
are then formulated for determining the values of the parameters used in
the measure of effectiveness. Since the values of some of the parameters
in the measure arc dependent upon the characteristics of the attack to be
defended against, consideration is then given to the problem of determining

the expected values of the variables which characterize an attack.
Finally, the use of the measure is examined for the comparison of
teams under each of the operating conditions described in part two of
this introduction, since it is believed that these are the two general
conditions under which teams must be chosen.
4. Assumptions
The following assumptions have been nnade and apply throughout:
(1) The primary mission of any naval surface unit defense is
the immediate defense of the unit. For this reason no
targets will be engaged after they have passed their weapon
release range.
(Z) A ship may have several nnissile control stations and each
control station may control several missiles simultaneously;
however, one missile control station can engage only one
target at a tinne. This assumption limits the number of
simultaneously engaged targets to the number of available
control stations.
(3) The number of control stations assigned to a team will be
determined by the estimated number of aircraft in the
expected attack and the characteristics of the team selected
for defense.
(4) All attacking aircraft are detected by a certain minimum
range.

CHAPTER II
THE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND TARGET CONSIDERATION
1. The measure of effectiveness
In choosing a measure of effectiveness for comparing the various
guided missile teams, the following factors are considered:
(1) The cost of a guided missile is much greater than that of any
expendable weapon ever before used for defensive purposes. '
This cost is so great that it can no longer be ignored as a factor
when planning a defense.
(Z) The great increase in the lethality of weapons in the past decade
makes it highly desirable that defenses be tightened. The alter-
native is to accept greater losses in the protected unit.
(3) A defense may be tightened by increasing the volume of fire.
However, increasing the volume of fire, when the defensive
weapon is a guided missile (the cost of which may be an apprec-
iable fraction of the cost of the unit being protected) can easily
make the cost of the defense more than the value of the protected
unit. In such cases it nriay be necessary to strike a compromise
between the level of defense achievable and the expected daiYiage
to the protected unit in order to minimize the total cost (i. e. the
amount expended for defense plus the amount necessary to repair
or replace the damage to the protected unit).
(4) When the operating condition is such that minimisation of damage
to the protected unit is the primary objective of the defense, the
cost of the defense becomes a secondary consideration and a
measure of effectiveness which stresses
4

probability of a kill is indicated. Alternatively , when the
operating condition allows a choice of the level of defense,
total cost to us may become the fundamental factor in the
measure of effectiveness.
The measure of effectiveness has therefore been chosen as a ratio
of the two fundamental comparison criteria as follows:
1^ p, _ Probability that an attacking aircraft is destroyed
Total expected cost to us
Definition of the nneasure of effectiveness as a ratio of the two fundannen-
tal comparison criteria insures consideration of both, regardless of the
operating condition under which the teann is to be chosen. This form of
the measure of effectiveness also insures that it rennain a sensitive
instrument for comparison, regardless of the characteristics of the
teams to be compared.
Since the value of most material things can be conveniently measur-
ed in terms of dollars, this unit is taken as a measure of the total cost
to us. By putting the expression for M. E. into a mathematical form, a
quantitative estimate can be nnad e of the relative worth of several teams.
The mathematical form of the measure of effectiveness is,
f ( ;)(Ph)'(i-Ph)''"'
^•^- = f^ y (n)(Pt)r(i.i^,n.rD(L^^) (D
The numerator of this expression is the probability that a detected and
engaged aircraft be destroyed. In the numerato^r, the symbol P^^
represents the probability that any single missile fired hits the target,
the symbol x represents the minimum number of hits necessary for
destruction of the target, and the symbol n represents the number of
missiles fired at the target.

The denominator of this expression is the total expected cost to us
and is the sum of two factors. These are: (1) the direct cost of the
missiles expended in attempting to destroy the attacking aircraft and
(Z) the cost of repairing the damage or replacing the ships sunk by the
attacking aircraft if it penetrates the defense. In the denominator the
symbol C represents the cost of the missile in dollars, the symbol
D(l,v) represents a dannage factor, which is a function of the lethality
of the enemy weapon and the vulnerability of the class of vessel being
protected, expressed in dollars, and the rest of the second term is the
complement of the numerator, i. e. the probability that the attacking
aircraft penetrates the defense.
When the characteristics of the missile are such that only one hit
is required for destruction of the target, expression (I) reduces to the
form,
1 - (1 - Py,f
M.E. = 2 (II)
nC^ + (1 -P,r D(L,v)m n
It must be emphasized that in those cases where the parameter x
assumes values greater than one the denominator of expression (I)
represents the maximum expected cost to us for the following reason:
There will be an expected number of aircraft which will survive even
thought having been hit one or more times but less than x times. These
aircraft may have been damaged enough by the hits sustained to lessen
or even void their potential lethality.

2. Target considerations
Any possible aircraft attack is determined by specifying the values
of the following essential variables:
(1) Aircraft velocity
(2) Aircraft altitude
(3) Aircraft armament
(4) Armament release range
(5) Number of aircraft
(6) Attack procedures
It is. of course, impossible to specify in advance the values which any
of the variables of an attack will assume, since they may take on any
value, within specific limits, at the discretion of the enemy. The best
that can be done is to determine the expected values of these variables,
calculated on the basis of an assumed frequency of occurrence. The
method of arriving at the values ofHhe essential variables for the expected
attack is described in Appendix A.
The computation necessary to determine the expected values of the
essential variables can be somewhat simplified by grouping the possible
enemy attacks into two categories. These are:
(1) Attacks employing armament having its own propulsion. An
exannple of such armament is an air-to-surface guided missile
whose release range is essentially independent of releasing
aircraft speed and altitude.
(Z) Attacks employing armament without its own propulsion. An
example of such armannent is a conventional bomb or glide

bomb whose release range is totally dependent upon releasing
aircraft speed and altitude.
Attacks falling into category one above can be fully specified only by
assigning values to all the listed essential variables. Attacks falling
in category two above can be fully specified by assigning values to the
independent variables (1), (2), (3), and (5), the value of variable (4)
being completely determined by the values of variables (1) and (Z). To
specify the expected values for the variables of an attack, the methods
of Appendix A may be used if data on past attacks are available. If such
data are not available, the values for these variables must be estimated
fronn intelligence information or some other means.

CHAPTER III
THE APPLICATION OF THE MEASURE TO A HYPOTHETICAL
PROBLEM
There are two general cases into which a typical problem may be
classified.
Case (1) Military necessity dictates that the expected damage to our
forces must not exceed a certain fixed level. An example of such a case
would be the delivery by convoy of items which have suddenly become
critical in the first stages of an invasio^. The loss of more than a cer-
tain number of ships from this convoy would jeopardize the success of
the invasion. Such conditions dictate that the cost of the weapon is insig-
nificant, and they will in general be the result of tactical considerations.
Case (2) The military situation does not dictate that expected losses be
held to any fixed minimum, but it is desirable that, over an extended
period, the mission be accomplished as economically as possible. An
example of such a case would be the build up of forces by convoy prepar-
atory to mounting an invasion. Such cases will usually evolve from
strategic rather than tactical considerations.
Certain aspects of the method are applicable to both cases. The
program will be to demonstrate the nnethod to the point where it no
longer applies equally to both cases, at which juncture each case will
be considered separately.
For purposes of demonstration, let us assume that the Commander
upon whom falls the responsibility of assigning guided missile teams
for anti-aircraft protection of convoys has three basic types of teams

available, with characteristics as follows:
m
m
m
Team 1 Team 2 Team 3
ZO miles 40 iniles 80 miles
6/min 1. 5/min . 5/min
3 nnin 4 min 5 min
$5K $10K • $15K
2 1 1
.5 .6 .7
1200 kts 1000 kts 700 kts
Information on 40 recent attacks is available and is as follows:
^t
f
200 1
300 5
400 7
500 25
600 2
\ f
100 ft 5
500 18
5000 7
10.000 6
20.000 3
30,000 1
N f
1 5
2 9
3 2
4 16
6 4
8 4
R
8
f
1 nnile 20
2 8
5 7
20 4
40 1
L f
2 10
4 16
6 8
10 4
20
From the foregoing information, the essential variables of the
expected attack can be computed, by the method of Appendix A where
10

no trend or distribution is recognizable, as:
V^ - 455 kts
h = 4,862 ft
t
N = 3. 75
R = 4. 75 miles
s
L a 5. 3 500 lb. bombs
L«et us further assunne that for the convoy to be protected and the expected
value of L, the value of D(L,v) = .5x10 dollars.
The limiting value of n is now calculated for each of the three teams
to be compared. This will be illustrated in detail for team 1, the value
for the other two being calculated in the same manner. Using expression
(Z) of Appendix B , and assuming a detection range of 100 nriiles, T , s 9 'Z
minutes. Since T. for this team is less than the computed value of T
,
enter figure (2) with T , = 9 ^'2 and V = 455 obtaining R- = 28 miles.
This firing range assures R. s 20 miles. Now, by combining express-
ion (5) of Appendix B with the assumption that we do not desire to engage
the target after he releases his armament, n = 12 . By the same
procedure n s 7, 2 for teams 2 and 3 respectively..
From this point on the procedure differs according to whether or
not a limit to the expected damage is set.
Case I The case of limited expected damag e
When the limit of expected damage is specified, the controlling
criterion is whether or not a team has the capability of providing a
value of .
r =
11

where M is the designated upper limit of expected damage per attack-
ing aircraft. Any team which does not have this capability can be
immediately dropped from consideration, and those remaining can be
compared to choose the optimun^ one. To determine which teams have
the capability, note that the value of D(L,v) is determined by the
value calculated for L of the expected attack, and the composition
of the convoy. Therefore the value that n must assunrie to nneet the
imposed damage restriction can be compared to the previously comput-
ed limiting values for n as a nrieans of rejecting those teams which
cannot nneet the iznposed damage restriction. This value that n must
assume can be arrived at by means of graphs, of which figures (3)a and
(3)b are typical, by selecting the next larger integral value of n for
which 1 - P^, < i^^j
Comparing the previously computed limiting values of n with the
required values of n , it is seen that team 3 cannot meet the require-
ments. This is not what one would intuitively expect, inasmuch as team
3 has the greatest hit probability, the longest range, and a nninimum
number of hits necessary for a kill.
It now remains to compare the two systems which have the required
minimum value of n to resolve the problem of which of these two is
optimum under these conditions. Since both have the ability to hold the
damage to the required minimum, the problem of evaluating these two
to determine the optimum degenerates to that described in the next case
with one restriction. This restriction is that the minimum value used
for n must be greater than or equal to that determined as the value
which n must have to meet the imposed damage restriction.
12

This completes the procedure to be used when an upper limit of
damage to our forces is specified.
Case II The case where no upper limit of damage is specified
.
In the case where no limit of damage is prescribed, the optimal
team will be the one which causes expression I or II to assume the
greatest value. Solving these expressions by the usual nnathematical
process for maximization leads to a transcendental equation which is
most easily solved by graphical methods. For this reason, a graphical
method of using overlays has been devised from which the value of n
which maximizes the expression for a particular team, and the quanti-
tative value assigned the team for this maximizing value of n can be
readily calculated. The process is as follows:
log ME = log Pj^ . log [nC^ + (1 -P^) D(L.v) ]
Now if a curve of log P, vs. n is plotted and a curve of
log [nC + (1 - P, ) D(L,v)] vs. n is plotted on the sanne coordinates,
log ME will be a maximunn at that value of n where the ordinate between
the curves is a maximum. It follows that when log ME is a maximum,
M E is a maximum; therefore the quantitative measure of the team, when
the optimal number of missiles is fired, is obtained by taking the antilog
of the maximum ordinate between the curves.
By plotting a family of curves of log P^ vs. n with P^ a para-
meter, for each value of x , a basic series of underlays can be made.
Two typical such underlays are presented as figures (4)a and (4)b.
Overlays can be made by plotting log [nC + (1 - Pj^^) D(L. v) ] vs. n
with P, a parameter for various ratios of C^ to D(L,v). one set of
m
m
13

overlays for each value of x being necessary. Partial overlays
covering the range of values specified in this demonstration problem
are included as figures (5)a. (5)b, and (5)c .
The comparison of the three teams is made as follows:
(a) For the team to be compared, select an underlay plotted for
the appropriate value of x . For team 1 this underlay is figure (4)a.
(b) Determine the ratio of C to D(L,v) and select an overlay
nn
for that ratio and the same value of x as the underlay. For team 1
this overlay is figure (5)a.
(c) Superimpose the overlay on the underlay and read that value
of n which has the largest value of the ordinate between the curves,
plotted for the applicable value of P,
.
(d) If this value of n is greater than the limiting value of n deter-
mined by means of Appendix B, take the value of the ordinate between
the curves at the limiting value of n . The antilog of this quantity is the
quantitative measure of the team.
(e) If the value of n , where the nnaximum ordinate between the
curves appears, is less than the linniting value of n , take the value of
the ordinate between the curves at the next higher or next lower integral
value of n , whichever is greater. The antilog of this value is the
quantitative measure of the team.
(f) The team which has the greatest quantitative value as a result
of this procedure is then the optimum team to use under these conditions.
14

Using the above procedure, the following results are obtained:
Optimum value of n Comparison factor
Team 1 7 6.46
Team 2 4 7. 55
Team 3 3(limiting valuesZ) 6. 22(for limiting value)
The following statement can therefore be made: Using the procedure
described herein the optimal number of missiles to be fired under the
conditions of this problem is as indicated in tlje above table, and providing
the optimal nunnber of missiles is used, team 2 is better than team 1 by
a factor of 1.17 and better than team 3 by a factor of 1.21.
15
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APPENDIX A
Techniques for Assigning Values to the Essential
Variables of an Attack.
The essential variables of any attack by aircraft have been listed
in Chapter II of this study. The purpose of this appendix is to discuss
means of determining the values to be assigned to these variables.
There are three conceivable ways in which the values assigned to
the variables of an attack may be chosen. These ways may be labeled:
(1) Outright guessing
(2) Game theoretic methods
(3) Application of Statistical methods.
At the outbreak of hostilities data on past attacks will not be avail-
able and outright guessing or scientific guessing must be used. Outright
guessing is the least desirable method but may be necessary. In this
procedure a value is assigned to each of the variables on the basis of
intelligence reports, our knowledge of our own weaknesses and any
other factors which are considered applicable. Application of game
theory may be a better procedure to use in the absence of data on past
attacks if it is possible to play a meaningful two person game. Whether
the use of game theory is possible, and the procedure to use if it is
possible are considered beyond the scope of this paper. It is believed,
nevertheless, that such methods may have application to this problem.
When data on past attacks are available, statistical methods may
be employed. It is believed that statistical methods are to be preferred
when their employment is possible. The use of statistical methods
requires that two fundamental questions be answered immediately. Are
the stochastic variables involved independent, and are these variables
17

essentially discrete or continuous in nature? The question of independ-
ence can be answered by stating that over the range to which the variables
in question are limited they can be considered independent. The question
of discrete or continuous nature can be answered by stating that, despite
the fact that they xnight take on any value within c ertain limits, enemy
doctrine and equipment pecularities will probably cause these variables
to assume a discrete character. The variables of an attack are therefore
assumed to be independent and discrete.
Data on past attacks is nothing more than a sample taken from a
parent population. Certain inferences can be made concerning the
parent population by examining the paranneters associated with these
samples. A trend might be indicated or a distribution which the enemy
was using might be discovered. For example, the enemy nnay have
elected to vary his attack altitude stochastically using a normal distribut-
ion of frequency. A sample should be examined for these possibilities.
It is believed, however, that in reality the values that the variables of
an attack assume will be primarily influenced by the situation at the time
of the attack. Consequently, the most likely use to which data could be
put would be the calculation of simple expected values for eadh of the
variables.
Under the assumption of independence and discreteness, the
expected values of each of the variables could then be computed from the
expression*^
r max
.r = 5Ir,f(r.),
i=rmin
18

where r is a value which the variable has taken and f(r) is the relative
frequency of occurrence associated with that value.
When it is known that the enemy is not employing powered armannent
the expected value of armament release range ( R ) may be computed
from the expression
Zh. v.^ h/ VzR = { —LJL + ' )
8 g
where h is the expected value of target altitude, V is the expected
value of target velocity, and g is the force of gravity.
19



APPENDIX B
Determination of the Limiting Value for Number of
of Missiles Fired
As stated in Chapter III of this fetudy, it is necessary that a linnit-
ing value for the number of missiles that can be fired by one control
station at one target be determined. The purpose of this appendix is to
define a procedure for the determination of this value.
With reference to Figure (1) on the previous page, it can be shown
that Rj . (R^, - ^ (R^^ - h]) VT^ + V^^ T^^ ) "z (1)
where R is the target range at time of missile firing. R is the
range at which target is detected, h is target altitude, V is target
Velocity, and T is the elapsed time from time of target detection to
d
time of missile firing. ( T , is the sum of T- , the time it takes to ready
the missile for firing, and T^, the time a ready missile must be held
while the target approaches nnissile range. ) For radar detection ranges,
h. is insignificant and expression (I) reduces to R- » R , - V^ T , .
t ° ^ f d t d
Curves of R vs. V. with T , a parameter are plotted in Figure (Z).
A question arises concerning the value of T , to use in entering
Figure (^), since T , is a function of missile nnaximum range. It can
be dennonstrated that the necessary condition for the target range at inter-
cept to be less than or equal to the missile maximum range is
V m t
where R is missile maxinnum range and V is missile velocity,m ^ m '
Accordingly, for missiles whose T- is less than T , as computed by
expression (Z) enter Figure (Z) with the computed value of T
, ,
otherwise
21

enter Figure (Z) with a value for T , equal to T. . Negative values of
T, as computed from expression (Z) merely indicate that missile range
is not a factor which need be considered; therefore use the known value of
T, for T when entering Figure (2).
i d
From a further consideration of Figure (1), it can be determined
R = 1 ""ru . ' L^ 1. (3)
' i-<^^/v^)' <-^t
where 'R. is the range of the target when the first missile fired intercepts,
It is required that all missiles that are fired intercept the target
between range R. and R , where R is the enemy weapon release
2 Z Z iVz
range. This distance along the target path is (R. -h ) - (R - hj
Therefore, the time available for interception is
(^\ -hf/'i
.r2 .h^ /'Z
t = LJ LJ liLs lij_ (4)
^t
But the number of missiles which can be fired is the product of the
rate of fire of the system and the time available to fire, i. e. ,
,^ .2^1/7 ,.2 ^Z,l/2
r[(Ri
- ht ) ^ - (Rs - ^t ) Mn = rt = —^'^ —
V.
This value for n is the limiting value which n may assume based upon
the characteristics of the team and the values specified for the essential
variables of the attack.
In most practical cases, the quantity h may be deleted from
all the above expressions as insignificant.
22

LIST OF SYMBOLS
V Target velocity
V Expected attack velocity
h Target altitude
h Expected attack altitude
L Lethality of enemy armament relative to 1-500 lb bomb
L Expected attack weapon lethality
N Number of attacking aircraft per attack
N Expected number of attacking aircraft
R Attack weapon release range
R Expected attabk weapon release range
R. Target slant range at which first missile launched
makes interception.
R^ Target slant range at time first missile is fired.
R Slant range at which target is detected.
R Missile maximum rangem
P, Single shot probability that missile reaches fuze actuation
range, and fuze actuates.
X Number of missiles which must reach fuze actuation range
with fuze actuation to give a near certain probability of
target destruction.
n Number of missiles fired at one target.
V Average surface vessel vulnerability to one 500 lb bomb.
There will be a characteristic value for each major type
of vessel.
C^^ Cost of one missile. This may be relative to the cost of
the protected unit or the expected damage factor.m
D(L,v) Damage factor. A function of the vulnerability of the class
being protected and the expected lethality of the attack weapon.
23

T Elapsed time between target detection and missile
ready to fire.
T The time that a missile which is ready to fire is held,
while
target approaches missile maximum range.w
T Dead time. The sum of T^ and Td I w
r Rate of fire
V Velocity of missilem
24
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